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Numerous studies have shown the potential for U.S. manufacturing to cut its energy costs 
by installing more efficient equipment that offer competitive payback periods, but the 
realization of this potential is hindered by numerous obstacles. This paper evaluates 
seven federal policy options aimed at revitalizing U.S. manufacturing by improving its 
energy economics while also achieving environmental and energy reliability goals. 
Traditionally, policy analysts have examined the cost-effectiveness of energy policies 
using deterministic assumptions. When risk factors are introduced, they are typically 
examined using sensitivity analysis to focused on alternative assumptions about budgets, 
policy design, energy prices, and other such variables. In this paper we also explicitly 
model the stochastic nature of several key risk factors including future energy prices, 
damages from climate change, and the cost of criteria pollutants. Using these two 
approaches, each policy is “stress tested” to evaluate the likely range of private and social 
returns on investment. Overall we conclude that the societal cost-effectiveness of policies 
is generally more sensitive to alternative assumptions about damages from criteria 
pollutants and climate change compared with energy prices; however, risks also vary 
across policies based partly on the technologies they target.  
 
 





History has shown that the energy sector is highly vulnerable to unanticipated and unpredictable 
occurrences that undermine the ability to forecast the precise outcomes of energy policy 
initiatives. It has been suggested that U.S. industrial policy is uniquely capable of expanding 
U.S. employment opportunities while promoting a clean energy economy. Improving the energy 
efficiency of industry, in particular, is seen as essential for maintaining the viability of domestic 
manufacturing, especially in a world economy where production is shifting to low-cost, less 
regulated developing countries. Numerous studies have estimated a large potential for cost-
effective energy-savings in U.S. manufacturing, but a variety of obstacles hinder the realization 
of this potential. This paper evaluates seven federal policy options aimed ultimately at reviving 
U.S. manufacturing by improving its energy economics while also achieving environmental and 
energy reliability goals.   
 
The policy options that we evaluate are grounded in an understanding of industrial decision-
making and the barriers impeding efficiency improvements. At the same time, our analysis 
recognizes that forecasting outcomes of energy policies must consider the unexpected. As a 
result, when we were asked to identify and evaluate federal policy options to motivate greater 
investment in energy-efficient manufacturing, we elected to conduct this assessment within the 
context of key uncertainties. Past research underscored the challenge of curbing industry’s 
energy consumption and greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions while at the same time becoming 
more globally competitive. Well documented barriers to increasing investments in industrial 
energy efficiency in combination with unexpected “black swans” such as the recent global 
economic downturn help to explain the remaining existence of a large energy-efficiency gap in 
U.S. industry (CCCSTI, 2009; Brown, Cortes, and Cox, 2010).  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the process and criteria by which our 
policy options were selected, and present a short description of each option. In Section 3, we 
describe the structure of our policy analysis of the seven options, taking into account the private 
perspective including investment costs and energy cost savings, and the societal perspective 
including the direct cost of policy implementation and the benefits of reductions in CO2 
emissions and criteria pollutants. Section 4 describes the methods we used to include 
uncertainties in policy design, future energy prices, and the damage costs of criteria pollutants 
and CO2 emissions. Section 5 presents the results, and our conclusions are discussed in Section 
6. 
 
2. Selection of Federal Energy Policy Options  
 
To define the policy options for detailed analysis, the research team met with stakeholders from 
government, industry, and other relevant sectors, convened a workshop of experts, consulted the 
academic and industry literature, and examined legislative actions to provide insights into the 
political feasibility of alternative energy policies. Because the focus of this study is on methods 
for accelerating the deployment of existing energy-efficient technologies, we did not consider 
policy approaches focusing on improved technical performance or reduced implementation costs 




Numerous policies were considered for detailed analysis, and these were reduced to a short list of 
seven policy options, by applying eight policy evaluation criteria.  
 
• Appropriateness of the Federal Role. The policy must clearly define an appropriate federal 
role, one that does not pre-empt state or local action. 
• Broad Applicability. Since the number of proposed policy options and measures to be 
analyzed is small, but the desired impact is large, those policy options selected for analysis 
should be broadly applicable. 
• Significant Potential Benefits. Those options that produce large benefits should be favored 
over those producing fewer benefits. 
• Technology Readiness. The policy options selected should address barriers and/or risks of 
mainly an institutional, policy, or non-technical nature.  
• Cost Effectiveness. In selecting policies to study, consideration should be limited to those 
that would be expected to have reasonable costs, significant social benefits, and a relatively 
high benefit-to-cost ratio.  
• Administrative Feasibility. Policies selected should be fairly easy to implement, manage, 
and enforce. Some may require training a large workforce for implementation, while others 
may be able to focus training on limited players within the delivery system. The latter is 
obviously more desirable.  
• Additionality. The selected policy options should each represent different approaches to 
barriers or to different market segments. Each policy option should be evaluated in terms of 
the independent contribution it could make above and beyond existing policies.  
• Potential for Rapid Implementation. Preference should be given to policies that can deliver 
benefits rapidly. 
 
These criteria were developed in consultation with DOE’s Office of Policy and International 
Affairs, and in previous research that benefited from substantial peer review including two 
workshops with industrial and academic policy experts. Another application of these criteria can 
be found in an assessment of federal policy options for promoting greater energy efficiency in 
the housing market (Brown, et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 1 shows the seven policy options that passed the screening based on these eight 
evaluation criteria. The figure reflects the fact that any new policy initiatives must be integrated 
into the landscape of policies and programs that are already in place (illustrated by the left-hand 
boxes). The numerous arrows and linkages in this figure highlight the portfolio nature of the 
seven policies, which can be classed in three groups – regulatory, information/training, and 




Figure 1. Industrial Energy-Efficiency Policy Options  
 
 
Two of these policy options address federal and state regulatory hurdles (shown in yellow in 
Figure 1) that limit the opportunities for firms to invest in efficiency. Both of these aim to 
increase energy-savings from combined heat and power (CHP) systems: 
 
Output-Based Emissions Standards (OBES) would provide financial incentives and technical 
assistance to states to spur adoption of OBES – as authorized by the EPA – to reduce energy 
consumption, emissions of criteria air pollutants and GHG, and regulatory burdens.  This 
program would not require any new authority for DOE, as it would use authorities and criteria of 
the State Energy Program to achieve this regulatory change.  Several states have already 
implemented variants of these standards within their jurisdictions, and a national effort could 
lead to widespread cogeneration at factories and large facilities over the near and long terms. 
 
A Federal Energy Portfolio Standard (EPS) with CHP would entail federal legislation 
mandates electric distributors to meet an EPS with CHP as an eligible resource and to extend and 
expand the current investment tax credits for CHP. Such standards exist in several states, and 
EPS proposals have been considered in several bills before Congress. This policy option would 
concurrently establish measurement and verification methods for qualifying CHP resources and 
encourage a national market for trading energy-efficiency credits. 
 
Three of the policy options would help fill information gaps and workforce training needs in 
industry (green in Figure 1), targeting small, medium, and large firms: 
 
Incentives to promote the adoption of the Superior Energy Performance (SEP) program would 
facilitate a broader market penetration of energy management systems that foster continual 
improvement in the energy efficiency of industrial facilities. Incentives would include 1) a 
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federal production tax credit for energy-efficiency savings of facilities that become SEP 
certified; 2) the ability of verified energy savings to be counted as an energy-efficiency credit in 
compliance with meeting energy-efficiency or renewable energy portfolio requirements; 3) an 
energy-efficiency grant for 30% of eligible certification costs; and 4) recognition programs. 
DOE, universities, and private sector partners are already laying the groundwork toward 
adoption of SEP, but a committed federal policy could lead to cultural changes and market 
transformation for facilities and service providers, particularly at large firms. 
 
Implementation Support Services (ISS) would work with existing Industrial Assessment 
Centers (IAC) to increase the implementation of energy-saving opportunities identified in IAC 
energy audits. ISS would foster higher implementation rates by leveraging existing relationships 
between industrial facilities, financial institutions, and engineering firms. Providing this level of 
technical and business support subsequent to initial IAC energy assessments would not only 
generate additional energy savings, but would also facilitate the workforce development of 
undergraduate business students with an understanding and appreciation of energy management.  
This policy option would necessitate an increase in the funding level of the IAC program to 
permit additional energy assessments at industrial facilities. 
 
Small Firm Energy Management would provide small manufacturing firms (five to 49 
employees) with energy management software tools to build in-house capacity to manage energy 
use and identify potential energy savings opportunities, and potentially qualify small firms to be 
part of IAC assessments. Current ITP programs provide few services and programs tailored to 
the needs of these important manufacturing enterprises, which are often the crucible of 
innovation and economic growth. While addressing only a small-percentage of industrial sector 
energy use, this cost-effective program would allow these small businesses without in-house 
capacity to reduce their energy bills and carbon footprints, thereby improving their economic 
viability. Establishment of this program would require Congressional appropriation of DOE 
funding. 
 
The final two policies would tackle financial barriers (blue in Figure 1) by providing new 
opportunities for capital for energy-efficient systems, equipment, and operations: 
 
Tax Lien Financing of industrial energy-efficiency improvements, also known as Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing, would require federal legislation to enable 
municipalities to establish clean energy taxation districts, which can issue tax-free bonds for 
certified energy-efficiency and alternative energy projects.  To address the risk of firm closures 
(particularly during economic recessions), DOE would offer federal loan guarantees to provide 
security for the bond purchasers and provide a standardized format for the application process.  
Municipalities have established PACE financing within their communities; however, the 
industrial sector has not yet been able to participate in these beneficial programs that would help 
increase access to capital for energy efficiency projects.   
 
Energy-Efficient Industrial Motor Rebates, similar to recent legislative proposals, would 
authorize and appropriate funding for the DOE to implement a program to provide industrial 
firms and motor manufactures with rebates for purchases of certified high-efficiency motors of 
25 to 500 horsepower that replace motors that predate the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The goal is 
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to accelerate adoption of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 standard motors.  
DOE would give priority and additional technical assistance to companies that include motor 
upgrades as part of a system-wide optimization of their facilities and promote further efficiency 
measures. 
 
3. Policy Analysis: The Basic Elements  
 
The seven policies as a whole are designed to complement one another in order to achieve 
maximum savings. However, each is evaluated individually to determine if it could produce 
significant and cost-effective energy savings, carbon emissions reductions, if implemented on its 
own.  
 
3.1 The Magnitude and Value of Energy Savings 
 
Spreadsheet analysis is the principal evaluative tool, supplemented by Georgia Tech’s version of 
the National Energy Management System (NEMS), the Department of Energy’s principal 
energy-economic modeling tool. NEMS was used to evaluate the OBES and EPS policy options 
because it has a detailed methodology for evaluating the market penetration of CHP technologies 
in different subsectors of industry. The Annual Energy Outlook 2010 (EIA, 2010b) reference 
case is used as the baseline forecast of the nation’s industrial fuel consumption by energy sources 
out to 2035. Investments stimulated from each policy are assumed to begin in 2011 and to occur 
through 2035 (or shorter in the case of the Industrial Motor Rebate program, which is a short-
term “stimulus” policy). Energy savings are then modeled to degrade at a rate of 5% after 2035, 
such that all benefits from the policy have ended by 2055. 
 
The value of energy saved by five of the policy options is calculated using the energy price 
forecasts in the “reference case” described in the Annual Energy Outlook 2010. For example, 
electricity prices nationwide averaged $19.15/MMBtu in 2010 and after declining to 
$17.11/MMBtu in 2011, they are forecast to rise at a compound annual growth rate of 0.80% to 
$20.71/MMBtu in 2035 (in $2009). In contrast, natural gas prices are projected to rise more 
steeply at a compound annual growth rate of 1.83% from $5.17/MMBtu in 2011 to 
$8.03/MMBtu in 2035 in the same reference case.  
 
For the OBES and EPS policies that are modeled by GT-NEMS, energy prices are an output of 
the model. Since CHP technologies are fueled principally by natural gas, these policies cause a 
rise in natural gas prices, which in turn reduces natural gas consumption in other sectors of the 
economy. Electricity prices, on the other hand, are reduced because cogeneration results in 
electricity sales to the grid, which replace more expensive electricity generation. Lower-priced 
electricity in turn results in a slight increase in electricity consumption in other sectors, as would 
be expected based on the price elasticity of electricity demand (Epsey and Epsey, 2004; 
Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008). Accounting for these correlated factors in a general equilibrium 




3.2 The Magnitude and Value of Criteria Pollution 
 
Estimated reductions of SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and PM10 emissions are derived by comparing 
emissions from two sources (the electricity sector and industrial heat production) in the policy 
scenarios and the AEO 2010 reference case. The public health and environmental benefits of 
reduced emissions of criteria pollutants are evaluated using the damage estimates contained in a 
recent National Research Council report (NRC, 2010). This analysis excludes climate change, 
mercury, ecosystem impacts, and other environmental damages, but does include public health 
and crop damages. Altogether, damages caused by criteria pollution from coal power plants are 
estimated to exceed $62 billion annually. These damages average 3.3 cents per kWh in $2008 
(NRC, 2010).  
 
Natural gas use in the industrial sector also generates significant human health and 
environmental externalities when combusted to produce heat. NOx emissions are particularly 
high. In contrast, natural gas used for industrial feedstocks (as in the chemicals industry) have 
much lower NOx emissions. The NRC report (2010, p. 172) concludes that “a very rough order 
of magnitude estimate of average externalities associated with the industrial sector usage of 
natural gas is therefore 18 cents/MCF, excluding GHG damages. Thus, the six quads of natural 
gas used for industrial heat would generate about $4,600 million in damage.” See Table 1 for a 
summary of the air pollutant damages associated with emissions from electricity generation and 
industrial heat production.  
 
Table 1.  Criteria Air Pollutant Damages Associated with Emissions from Electricity 
Generation and Industrial Heat Production ($2008) 








Natural gas for 
electricity (¢/kWh) 
0.239 0.019 0.009 0.176 0.447 0.166 
Coal for electricity 
(¢/kWh) 
0.353 3.946 0.018 0.312 4.569 3.323 
Natural gas for 
industrial heat 
(¢/MCF) 
16.25 0.375 N/A 1.375 18.0 N/A 
N/A = not applicable. 
 
3.3  The Magnitude and Value of CO2 Emission Reductions 
 
The carbon dioxide emissions associated with energy consumption are derived from EPA 
(2007a) and the AEO 2010 (EIA, 2010). EIA (2010) estimates the industrial fuel consumption by 
source for each year between 2008 and 2035. It also forecasts the changing grid mix over time 
based on the energy resources used for electricity generation each year. Over time, the electric 
fuel mix becomes slightly less carbon intensive. We assume the same trajectory of industrial fuel 
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and electric grid mix over time. Using the conversion factors reported in EPA (2007a), we 
estimate the million metric tons of CO2 emitted per quad of industrial energy consumption.  
 
Where a policy is anticipated to promote energy efficiency across all fuels (as with the Superior 
Energy Performance program), the average emissions factor for the entire industrial sector was 
used. When a policy was more targeted to particular fuels (as with the industrial motor rebates, 
which only conserve electricity), conversion factors were based on the carbon intensity of 
individual fuels (Table 2). For the five policies evaluated with a spreadsheet analysis, the 
electricity saved is expected to have an average fuel mix, and is not based on reduced peak loads. 
 
Table 2.  Conversion of Energy Consumption to Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 
 
Million Metric Tons of CO2 Emitted 
 per Quad of Energy Consumed 
 
 2008 2020 2035 
Industry Sector Average 49.55 48.33 46.71 
Residual Fuel (No. 5 & 6 Fuel Oil) 77.64 77.64 77.64 
Natural Gas (Pipeline) 52.27 52.27 52.27 
Bituminous Coal 91.65 91.65 91.65 
Electricity 58.70 53.99 54.77 
Sources: Derived from EPA (2007a) and EIA (2010) 
 
We estimate the financial value of reduced CO2 emissions in a particular year by multiplying the 
decrement in emissions by the “social cost of carbon” (SCC) for that year. The SCC is defined as 
an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon 
emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net 
agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the 
value of ecosystem services due to climate change. The SCC used in this analysis is based on the 
central value estimates of the U.S. Government Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost 
of Carbon (EPA, 2010a).  In this report, the central value SCC estimates rose from $23/metric 




3.4  Policy Evaluation from the Private and Societal Perspectives 
 
The success of energy-efficiency policies in the industrial sector is contingent on motivating 
manufacturing enterprises to invest private capital and management resources to improving their 
energy economics. As a result, each of the policies is first evaluated from a private-sector, 
manufacturer’s perspective to assess the business case for the desired private-sector leverage. A 
detailed financial analysis of each policy is not feasible because it would require characterizing 
the tax liabilities and other characteristics of individual firms; however, estimating the up-front 
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private-sector investment costs relative to the stream of energy-expenditure reductions provides a 
basis for approximating the overall cash-flow attractiveness of each policy to manufacturers.  
 
Two metrics are emphasized: net private benefits and private benefit-cost ratio. On the benefits 
side of the metrics we include monetized energy savings; on the costs side, we include the 
private investment. Present-value calculations for the private-sector assessment were conducted 
using a 7% discount rate to be consistent with Office of Management and Budget guidelines 
(OMB, 2002; 2009), which recommend the use of 3% and 7% discount rates when evaluating 
regulatory proposals.  Our use of a 7% discount rate for evaluating the private manufacturer’s 
perspective is less than the 10% value used in some other studies such as McKinsey and 
Company’s analysis (Granade, et al., 2009). 
 
The policies are also evaluated in terms of their net societal benefits and their social benefit-cost 
ratios. On the benefits side of the metrics we include monetized energy savings, CO2 mitigation, 
and reductions of criteria air pollutants; on the costs side, we include both the private 
investments required as well as the public investments and administrative costs. In this paper, as 
in most detailed cost-benefit policy analysis, different benefit-cost ratios use different 
combinations of benefits and costs, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Present value 
calculations for the societal benefit-cost analysis were conducted using a 3% discount rate, with 
a 7% rate used in sensitivity analyses, consistent with Office of Management and Budget 
guidelines (OMB, 2002; 2009).  
 
4. Policy Design Uncertainties and Stochastic Valuation  
 
It is widely acknowledged that there are large uncertainties associated with estimating the 
benefits of future levels of energy efficiency and associated changes in CO2 emissions and 
criteria pollution. It is essential to provide estimates of key uncertainties, both to avoid any sense 
of over-precision in the calculated estimates, and to provide stakeholders and policy-makers with 
usable information for evaluating the risks associated with policy choices. Standard methods for 
calculating and reporting these uncertainties are only now emerging. In the sections below, we 
characterize key uncertainties in the context of estimating private and societal benefits and costs. 
 
Incorporating risk and uncertainty in the evaluation of policy options has typically involved two 
types of approaches. Traditionally, analysts have examined the cost-effectiveness of policies 
under a range of alternative design configurations, grounded in the desire to advocate the design 
that appears to deliver the best payback for the public expenditure. More recently, policies have 
been subjected to statistical analysis of a policy’s attractiveness when subjected to a Monte Carlo 
analysis of uncertainty. Both of these approaches are described below. 
 
4.1  Sensitivity Analysis of Key Policy Design Uncertainties 
 
Key design features of a public policy can evolve before, during and after its implementation. 
Thus, when proposing a policy initiative, it is useful to evaluate a range of design features to 
better understand the robustness of the policy to alternative constructions. For instance, does its 
cost effectiveness depend upon a certain level of participation? Is the level of free ridership a key 
determinant of success? Do the level and timing of public subsidies and participation rates drive 
 11 
the effectiveness of a policy? Is the amount of energy saved by each participant a key 
determinant of success? Are there critical parameter values at which estimated net benefits 
change sign? These are fundamental questions that need to be addressed early in a policy 
assessment.  
 
Sensitivity analysis usually proceeds by addressing one variable or assumption at a time.Classic 
examples of using sensitivity analysis in evaluating energy policy initiatives show the typical 
approach. Sensitivity analysis was used in the well documented case of evaluating a possible 
EPA standard for reduced lead in gasoline, focusing on the choice of a major reduction versus a 
total ban, the speed of implementation, and the possible creation of a secondary market for lead 
rights (Weimer and Vining, 2011). In evaluating the development of a strategic petroleum 
reserve (SPR), sensitivity analysis was used to assess alternative volumetric sizes for the SPR 
(Dunn, 2011). Recently, the Clean Energy Standards (CES) proposed by Senator Jeff Bingaman 
were analyzed by the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011a). While the bulk of the 
analysis performed by EIA focused on the principal policy proposal, sensitivity analyses were 
also completed to account for a wide range of uncertainties and possible policy designs, ranging 
from alternative treatments for existing nuclear and hydroelectric generation facilities, giving 
them either a partial or a full credit for generation to capping the cost of compliance credits and 
exempting small utilities from complying with the CES.  As a result, the range of projected clean 
energy production is quite wide, from 42% to 80% in 2035. 
 
For each of the seven federal policy options evaluated in this paper, we examine both a principal 
policy scenario and at least one alternative design addressing key policy features such as the 
duration of subsidies, speed of implementation, and participation rates. The discount rate used to 
reduce the value of future benefits and the cost of future investments over time is another cost-
effectiveness dimension that is varied. Considering the robustness of policies under alternative 
assumptions about discount rates is a fundamental component of a thorough sensitivity analysis. 
As stated in various OMB circulars, analyses should show the sensitivity of the discounted net 
present value and other outcomes to variations in the discount rate (OMB, 2002; 2009). 
 
4.2  Stochastic Representation of Energy Prices and Pollutant Co-benefits 
 
In addition to design choices, many uncertain variables such as future energy prices and the 
valuation of pollution externalities also contribute to overall uncertainties in cost-benefit 
analysis. (EPA 2010). We acknowledge up front that many of those kinds of uncertainty are not 
readily reducible to probability distributions, except through subjective expert judgment; 
moreover, whenever human health effects (including mortality) are a substantial component of 
costs or benefits, the valuation of those effects requires ethical judgments and not simply 
judgment of likelihoods. For many critics this implies that cost-benefit analysis is simply not a 
useful tool for decision support in these contexts (Sagoff 1988; Ackerman and Heinzerling 
2003). While we have sympathy for the concerns and are well aware that cost-benefit analysis is 
not sufficient as a decision-making rule (and is not even allowed as a decision rule under the 
Clean Air Act), as a practical matter the monetization of human health effects is an important 
element in ongoing decision-making. Thus we believe it is important to develop effective 
methods for analyzing the various ways in which the numbers produced by CBA are uncertain, 
and rendering that uncertainty visible in a way that is useful for stakeholder analysis and 
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decision-making. The representation of uncertainty as probability remains one of the best ways 
to do so. 
 
It is for these reasons that we use Monte Carlo analysis. The quantities which enter into our 
calculations – program costs, investment costs, energy prices, and pollution damage costs – can 
all be treated as if they are random variables, defined by deterministic and stochastic 
components. By representing the stochastic components with probability distributions and 
treating them as independent,1
 
 one can aggregate the uncertainty in the various parts of the 
anlysis into a single output distribution for the dependent variable (e.g., the cost-benefit ratio).  
The simulated distribution for the output variable informs the decision maker of the riskiness of 
the forecast, and of the skewness of the outcome. 
While a complete analysis of uncertainty is not possible, the establishment of effective processes, 
such as Monte Carlo simulation for determining levels of uncertainty in a specific model 
contributes to improved reliability and credibility of the model.  For this analsysis we used 
Simetar (Simulation for Excel to Analyze Risk), an Excel add-in simulation and econometric 
analysis tool, which is easy to use for processes including multiple regressions, hypothesis 
testing, time series analysis, and numerous econometric analyses, as well as Monte Carlo 
simulations.  
 
An obvious limitation to this form of modeling is that, in some of our analyses (specifically the 
OBES and SEP policies) we are applying post-hoc variation to prices in the cost-benefit analysis 
of policy scenarios in which the quantities of the relevant variables (e.g., electricity output) and 
the prices themselves are determined endogenously in the GT-NEMS model. Unfortunately a 
complex model like GT-NEMS which takes 12 to 24 hours to complete a simulation run on a 
personal computer is not well suited for Monte Carlo analysis. We justify our approach as a 
reasonable first order estimate of the contribution of specific risk factors (energy prices, pollution 
damages) to overall uncertainty in the benefit/cost ratios. Given the heroic assumptions 
necessary to interpret uncertainties as probability distributions, healthy caution is warranted in 
interpreting particular values of the output distributions as representing “true” uncertainty. That 
is to say, for example, that the 95th percentile value we report for the B/C ratio of a given policy 
is itself uncertain, and would vary, perhaps widely, with any of a score of reasonable alternative 
assumptions.1
 
 The sources of this “second order” uncertainty in the outputs extend beyond the 
Monte Carlo technique to include uncertainty in the parameterization of the input distributions, 
in the parameters not treated as stochastic, and in the model structure itself. The treatment of this 
second order uncertainty is important in its own right but is largely beyond the scope of this 
analysis; for our purposes, since characterizing the full range of this uncertainty is impossible, 
what matters is that the simplifications we use are demonstrably reasonable, and thus can be 
more valuable to decision makers than having no such probabilities at all. 
                                                 
1 Indeed the very premise of Monte Carlo modeling is that, for complex models that can only be 
run thousands rather than millions of times, the distribution of a particular set of runs is a sample 
of the “distribution of distributions” based on the random number sequence that is realized, and 
may itself have a substantial variance of the mean (and of the other moments of the distribution). 
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Characterizing the uncertainty of key input variables as probability distributions is the first step 
to incorporate uncertainty in the existing cost and benefit model. As will become evident, there 
are many possible ways one could characterize the uncertainty of, for example, future energy 
prices or the social cost of carbon, none of which are plainly the “best” such representation.  We 
strive here for a parsimonious model with as few parameters as possible, hoping to gain through 
transparency what we lose in realism. We begin with the example of energy prices, one of the 
obviously substantial contributors to the cost-benefit analysis of our proposed policies, especially 
from the private perspective (excluding externalities). 
 
Energy prices are a perfect example of variables for which future projections are not 
straightforwardly subject to statistical prediction (Cullenward et al, 2011). Certainly the 
properties of time series can be used to project forward in a way that is consistent with the 
historical variability. For example, Vithayasrichareon and MacGill (2011) conclude from historic 
data from the International Energy Agency that the standard deviation of gas price is best 
estimated as 30% of the mean, and coal as 10% of its mean. However for complex systems – like 
that which produces the indicators we call prices – the underlying processes remain unknowable, 
not least because of their dependence on human choice and innovation. The “true” value at some 
point in the future is better thought of as an emergent property of a path-dependent system, rather 
than the realization of a stochastic process. 
 
Nonetheless, our representation of a pathway of future prices in time as a function in two-
dimensional space lends itself to modeling of uncertainty as a band or envelope of future 
pathways. By parameterizing a simple function appropriately, a Monte Carlo simulation can be 
used to create a range of single realizations that generate a band with the appropriate variability 
and central tendency; and, crucially, by parameterizing multiple variables in this fashion, the 
uncertainty implicit in the various bands can be combined into an overall aggregate uncertainty 
represented as a probability.  
 
Indeed, given the many issues associated with interpreting the “input” variables probabilistically, 
one could argue that sensitivity analysis using plausible alternative values for key parameters is a 
more important tool than Monte Carlo analysis. For example, in some cases one could simply 
run the same policy exercise in GT-NEMS using the parameters from the alternative (e.g., high 
coal cost or high technology) scenarios. However, only in a Monte Carlo analysis can one see 
how the uncertainties in different variables combine, and judge the relative contribution of the 
uncertainty in different model input assumptions to the uncertainty in the output (dependent) 
variable of interest.  
 
Our approach, then, is to come up with simple representations of the key input variables that can 
be used in a Monte Carlo analysis. As a practical matter we have three broad kinds of variables. 
  
1) Energy prices are assumed to have an uncertain time trend and which can be considered 
to trace out a “band” or “envelope” around the reference case pathway, starting from a 
known price in the current year. 
2) Damage costs from criteria pollutants are assumed to be uncertain but not to have strong 
time trends, and thus can be treated as stochastic but constant values.  
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3) The social cost of carbon is both uncertain in the present and can be assumed to grow at a 
rate that is also uncertain.  
 
In the following section, we detail the assumptions we use to translate these characterizations of 
uncertainty into numerical values.  
 
Energy Prices.  Given that we are using the EIA’s reference case assumptions for AEO2011 to 
drive our GT-NEMS and spreadsheet modeling, we take the upper and lower bounds of the 
various alternative cases in AEO 2011 as reasonable (albeit conservative) indicators of the 
spread of future energy prices.2  More specifically, we calibrate a simple exponential function 
with three parameter values that reproduce the 2030 values from the reference case and the 
selected high and low alternative scenarios for each energy type, and then generate a distribution 
of pathways using a GRKS distribution (see below) for the annual growth rate as an input to 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
Our reference case forecast of industrial electricity prices comes from the Industrial Sector Key 
Indicators and Consumption table in AEO 2011 (EIA, 2010).  It provides the baseline for our 
policy analysis. Alternative scenarios are generated by varying the reference case assumptions.  
For example, the high technology case assumes earlier availability, lower costs, and higher 
energy-efficiency for more advanced energy production and end-use equipment. Energy price 
trends in the high technology case are likely to remain the lowest among all alternative scenarios. 
Another scenario is the high coal cost case, where the average annual productivity growth rates 
for coal mining are lower than those in the reference case.  Several costs, including coal mining 
wages, mine equipment costs, and other costs, are assumed to be about 28 percent higher than in 
the reference case; thus, the high coal cost case is likely to have the highest electricity prices. 
Electricity prices decrease from $19.15/MMBtu in 2010 to $17.11/MMBtu in 2011 and then 
increase gradually from $17.11/MMBtu in 2011 to $20.71/MMBtu in 2035 in the reference case.  
Together with the reference case, the high technology and high coal cost cases are used to 
calculate growth rates for 2012 to 2035.  The calculated growth rates are 0.17% (high technology 




Figure 2. Electricity Price 
 
Natural gas prices are projected to increase from $4.11/MMBtu in 2010 to $8.03/MMBtu in 2035 
in reference case. Three cases are used to calculate growth rate for 2012 to 2035.  The calculated 
growth rates are 0.96% (high technology case), 1.57% (reference case) and 1.65% (high coal cost 




Figure 3. Natural Gas Heat and Power Price 
 
Using three growth rates that recreate the low, median and high values in 2035, we can 
parameterize a modified triangular distribution called the GRKS distribution after for its 
developers, Gray, Richardson, Klose, and Schuman (Richardson, 2008).  The GRKS distribution 
was built in Simetar and is used to represent a continuous distribution when dealing with limited 
information about the random variable.  Given a minimum, median, and maximum value, like 
three growth rates, we can define a probability distribution.  Its minimum and maximum need 
not be located equidistant from the middle value, so the GRKS distribution can be a skewed 
distribution. It draws 2.28% of the values from below the minimum and 2.28% above the 
maximum to incorporate rare unexpected events; that is the minimum and maximum are treated 
as approximately two-sigma values, with small but non-zero probability outside their range. This 
generates plausible tails to the distribution in a way that takes account of the asymmetry of the 
input values. 
 
The growth rate of electricity prices is simulated with a GRKS distribution with a minimum 
value of 0.17%, a median value of 0.68%, and a maximum value of 0.91%. Due to the variability 
of the growth rate, the uncertainty of the price path increases over time, as shown in the fan 
graph in Figure 4. The 90% confidence interval (between the 5th and 95th percentiles) in 2035 is 
approximately the same as between the highest (high coal cost) and lowest (high technology) 
scenarios in AEO 2010. The deterministic electricity prices in the spreadsheet models for 




Figure 4. Fan Graph of Stochastic Electricity Price 
 
For natural gas, the minimum growth rate is 0.96%, the median (reference case) is 1.57%, and 
the maximum is, 1.65%. The distribution of the stochastic growth rate is left skewed. Simulated 
natural gas prices are presented in Figure 5 to describe the increasing variability over the years. 
Unlike electricity prices, stochastic natural gas price are expected to increase substantially. 
Deterministic natural gas prices in the seven policy excel spreadsheet models are also replaced 








Criteria Pollutants. Stochastic modeling of four criteria pollutants (SO2, NOx, PM2.5 and PM10) 
is conducted by using the range of values shown in Table 3, which is drawn from NRC ( 2009). 
As detailed in NRC (2009), the uncertainties shown arise from plant-level differences in 
emissions and geography; additional uncertainties would arise if variations in valuation 
assumptions or transport modeling were also included (Muller 2011). However, for a first-order 
estimate of overall uncertainty we use the 5th, 50th, and 90th percentile values as the min, 
median, and max in parameterizing a GKRS distribution; the mean and standard deviation 
calculated from this parameterization are shown in the rightmost columns. These stochastic 
values are then linked to the seven policy CBA calculations in our Excel spreadsheets.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of Criteria Pollutant Damage Values 
Distribution of Criteria-Air-Pollutant Damages per Kilowatt-Hour Associated with Emissions 
from 406 Coal-Fired Power Plants in 2005 (2007 Cents/kWh) 













SO2 3.8 4.1 0.24 2.5 11.9 3.96 3.15 
NOx 0.34 0.38 0.073 0.23 0.91 0.34 0.23 
PM2.5 0.3 0.44 0.019 0.13 1.1 0.3 0.3 
PM10 0.017 0.023 0.001 0.008 0.06 0.017 0.017 
Distribution of Criteria-Pollutant Damages per Kilowatt-Hour Associated with Emissions from 
498 Gas-Fired Power Plants in 2005 (2007 Cents/kWh) 













SO2 0.018 0.067 0.00013 0.0022 0.075 0.017 0.022 
NOx 0.23 0.74 0.0014 0.038 1 0.23 0.29 
PM2.5 0.17 0.56 0.00029 0.026 0.75 0.17 0.22 
PM10 0.009 0.029 0.00003 0.0014 0.036 0.008 0.01 
Commercial Sector Natural Gas Use for Heat: National Damage Estimates from Air Pollutants 
(Excluding Greenhouse Gases) (2007 Cents/MCF) (Damage Estimated from 2002 NEI Emission 
Data for 3,100 Counties) 













SO2 0.3 1.3 0.06 0.2 0.8 0.29 0.2 
NOx 13 35 3.5 9 27 11.54 6.27 
PM2.5 1.1 19 0.07 0.26 1.7 0.51 0.46 
Source: National Research Council (2009), Tables 2-9, 2-15, and 4-4. 
 
Social Cost of Carbon.  Uncertainty in the social cost of carbon has been a topic of substantial 
discussion, with published values ranging from negative values to many hundreds of dollars per 
ton of carbon dioxide (Tol, 2005). Some of the largest costs occur when the damages of climate 
change are characterized as being right skewed with fat tails – the so-called “dismal theorem” of 
climate change (Weitzman, 2009). Again, for a reasonable and parsimonious estimate of 
uncertainty, we base our range on the values recommended in the U.S. Government Interagency 
Working Group of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) (EPA, 2010).  In that report four different 
pathways for the SCC were reported, with values in 2010 ranging from $4.83/metric ton to 
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$67.50/metric ton, and annual growth rates ranging from 1.54% to 3.02%. In the deterministic 
calculations reported above, we used the central case; for our uncertainty analysis we used the 
low and high values as the min and max and the central case as the median to parameterize two 
GRKS distributions, one for the 2010 value and one for the growth rate. The fan graph in Figure 






Figure 6. Fan Graph of Stochastic Social Cost of Carbon 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Private Perspective on Cost-Effectiveness 
 
From the private perspective, our analysis indicates that each of the seven public policy options 
for promoting energy-efficiency in the industrial sector would be cost-effective for 
manufacturers. The present value of the stream of energy-expenditure reductions exceeds the 
present value of the manufacturer’s up-front investment costs using a 7 percent discount rate. As 
shown in Table 4, this conclusion holds is supported by both deterministic and stochastic 
calculations based on the methodologies described in Section 4. For our purposes we treat the 
investment costs as fixed and the energy savings as stochastic because of the uncertain nature of 
future energy prices. In reality, investment costs can also vary significantly as has been seen in 
recent years with the increase in the price of steel and industrial boilers and burners, which 
occurred in the economic boom preceding the 2008 global recession. At the same time, expanded 
deployment of a next generation of energy-efficient equipment encouraged by public policies 




Focusing first on the deterministic results shown in Table 4, a federal policy promoting output-
based emissions standards offers the largest net private benefits because the present value of 
energy savings attributed to the policy ($142 billion through 2055) far exceeds the associated 
private investment of $19 billion. Its private benefit-cost ratio, on the other hand, is not the 
highest among the policy options, because it does not involve any public subsidies. The Superior 
Energy Performance program and energy portfolio standard have higher benefit-cost ratios, 
partly as a result of including public subsidies that offset 30% of investment costs.  
 
At the lower end of the benefits scale, the Industrial Motor Rebates program saves manufacturers 
$908 million in energy costs, but it requires a private investment that is also large, at $220 
million. Thus, it has the smallest net present value to manufacturers and one of the smallest 
private benefit-cost ratio. Designed to provide rapid economic stimulus with rebates to support 
motor upgrades, its benefits come early, and its benefit-cost ratio in 2015 is higher than most of 
the other policies. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the results of the stochastic analysis from the manufacturer’s perspective. It 
uses box and whisker plots to portray the variability, with the bottom and top of the box defined 
by the 25th and 75th percentile (the lower and upper quartiles, respectively), and the band near 
the middle of the box denoting the 50th percentile (the median). The ends of the whiskers 
represent the minimum and maximum of all the data. The fact that the whiskers above each box 
are only slightly longer than those below each box reflect the near symmetry of the probability 
distribution for natural gas and electricity prices: we estimate that energy prices are almost as 
likely to fall below the forecast as they are to escalate above the forecast over the next 25 years. 
The box plots also highlight the greater variability in net private benefits associated with the two 
policies that promote combined heat and power (OBES and EPS). The significant uncertainty is 
a function of the broader range of possible future natural gas prices (reflecting their historic 
volatility) compared with electricity prices, which have been more stable in the U.S. In the 
stochastic analysis, the higher natural gas prices disadvantage EPS less than the OBES policy 
because its increase in natural gas consumption is much more modest (i.e., in 2035, EPS 
consumes approximately one quad more natural gas than in the reference case, while OBES 
consumes 2.5 quads more).  The EPS policy also benefits more from electricity savings. These 




Table 4. Private Benefit-Cost Analysis* 
Year 
Cumulative Private Benefits 
(Energy Savings)** 
Cumulative Private 
Cost Private Benefit-Cost Ratio 
Net Private Benefits 
(Billions $2009) 








Output Based Emissions Standards 
2020 5,400 61 12.6 4.9  48  
2035 15,100 117 18.8 6.2  98  








Energy Portfolio Standard With Combined Heat and Power 
2020 395 1.9 1.3 4.4  4.6  
2035 5,400 12.3 1.9 13.3  23.7  








Superior Energy Performance 
2020 2,050 8.9 3.3 2.7  5.6  
2035 26,300 65.4 10.2 6.4  55.1  













Cumulative Private Benefits 
(Energy Savings)** 
Cumulative Private 
Cost Private Benefit-Cost Ratio 
Net Private Benefits 
(Billions $2009) 








Implementation Support Services 
2020 510 2.3 1.2 1.9  1.1  
2035 2,500 7.1 2.2 3.2  4.9  








Small Firm Energy Management 
2020 124 1.0 0.30 3.4  0.73  
2035 587 3.0 0.58 5.2  2.43  








Tax Lien Financing 
2020 6,548 28.7 3.9 7.4  24.8  
2035 10,007 37.9 6.6 5.8  31.3  








Energy Efficient Industrial Motor Rebates 
2015 41.9 0.61 0.22 2.8  0.4  








*Present value of costs and benefits were calculated using a 7% discount rate.  
**Investments stimulated from the policy occur through 2035.  Energy savings are then modeled to degrade at a rate of 5% after 2035, such that all benefits from 
the policy have ended by 2055. 




Figure 7. Box and Whisker Plot of Net Private Benefit (7% discount rate) 
 
 
5.2 Societal Perspective on Cost-Effectiveness 
 
Table 5 compares the estimated total social cost of each policy (including both public and private 
costs) with the value of its anticipated social benefits based on energy savings, pollution 
prevention, and avoided carbon dioxide emissions. In this table, we calculate the total net social 
benefits by subtracting the present value of the private and public costs from the present value of 
the benefits using a 3% discount rate. The result for each of the seven policies is a positive net 
social benefit, meaning that the present value of the benefits exceeds the present value of the 
private and public costs. Again, both deterministic and stochastic calculations are presented. 
 
Similar to the analysis of cost-effectiveness from the manufacturer’s perspective, the societal 
perspective suggests that a federal policy promoting output-based emissions standards would 
offer the largest net social benefits, followed by the Superior Energy Performance program. Both 
policies also have high social benefit-cost ratios. OBES also has the lowest public costs since it 
only principally involves providing regulatory assistance to states; as a result, it would appear to 
be particularly attractive with today’s fiscally constrained federal budget. 
 
For both of these policy options, energy savings account for approximately two-thirds of the 
estimated total social benefits. The next largest source of social benefit comes from avoided 
criteria pollution, followed by the value of avoided carbon dioxide emissions. Where the policy 
reduces mostly natural gas consumption (OBES and EPS), the benefits of avoided CO2 are less 
than half of the benefits of avoided criteria pollution. Where the energy savings come principally 
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from electricity, which is entirely the case with energy-efficient industrial motor rebates, the 
value of avoided carbon dioxide and criteria pollution are comparable.  
 
Tax-lien financing and energy portfolio standards also would generate significant net societal 
benefits and have moderately high benefit-cost ratios, estimated at 6.3 and 5.5. As is the case 
from the manufacturer’s perspective, motor rebates offer the smallest net societal benefits and 
benefit-cost ratios, but they are nonetheless favorable and a higher proportion of their benefits 
occur in the first several years compared with the other six policies.
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Table 5. Social Benefit-Cost Analysis* 
 
Year 
Cumulative Social Benefits 
(Billions $2009) 



































Output Based Emissions Standards 
2020 71.3 6.76 19.0 97 0.0 13.8 13.8 7.0  83  













Energy Portfolio Standard With Combined Heat and Power 
2020 2.4 0.50 2.09 5.0 3.78 1.7 5.5 1.8  4.4  
2035 22.5 6.4 16.5 45.4 11.6 2.8 14.4 4.7  52.6  










Superior Energy Performance 
2020 12 2.1 3.8 20.6 2.10 4.3 6.4 3.2  14  
2035  122 23.8 34.4 191 2.16 17.0 19.2 10.0  172  









Implementation Support Services 
2020 2.9 0.5 1.0 4.0 0.22 1.48 1.7 2.6  2.7  
2035 12.0 2.3 3.6 17.9 0.49 3.29 3.8 4.7  14.1  










Cumulative Social Benefits 
(Billions $2009) 
Cumulative Social Costs 
(Billions $2009) 
Social Be  
Ra  
















Costs** Deterministic    
 
Small Firm Energy Management 
2020 1.3 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.10 0.35 0.45 3.3  1.1  
 25 
 
*Present value of costs and benefits were calculated using a 3% discount rate.  
**Total costs and benefits do not include various non-monetized values (e.g. mercury pollution reduction, increased 
productivity, water quality impacts, etc.). 
aStochastic values include the mean, standard deviation in parentheses, and the minimum and maximum. 
 
2035 5.1 0.6 0.6 6.2 0.24 0.88 1.12 5.4  5.1  











Tax Lien Financing 
2020 34.2 6.9 13.4 54.4 7.65 4.68 12.32 4.4  50.0  
2035 49.5 10.1 18.5 78.2 3.01 9.4 12.39 6.3  71.9  











Energy Efficient Industrial Motor Rebates 
2015 0.68 0.05 0.08 0.81 0.33 0.23 0.57 1.40  0.24   













The box and whisker plots visually present estimates of the ranges of net social benefits for the 
seven policies (Figure 8).  The fact that the bottom whiskers are shorter than the top whiskers 
indicate that the net social benefits for each of the policies are skewed to the right; that is, the 
bulk of the values are lower than their means, and this is offset by a smaller number of relatively 
high values. This is due to the probability distributions of the benefits from avoided CO2 and 
criteria pollution. These skewed distributions suggest that there is a small probability that the net 
social benefits of these energy-efficiency policies could be extremely large. 
 
As was true with the net private benefits, significant uncertainty is associated with the cost-
effectiveness of the two policies promoting combined heat and power. This large uncertainty 
reflects the range of possible future natural gas prices combined with the stochastic nature of the 
pollution-reduction benefits derived from displacing coal and oil boilers with cleaner fuels and 
more efficient electricity production. Unlike the CBA from the private perspective, there are also 
significant uncertainties surrounding the net social benefits of the other policy options, as well. 
This reflects the highly stochastic nature of the benefits from avoided CO2 and criteria pollution 
that are associated, in particular, with reductions in fossil-generated electricity resulting from 




Figure 8. Box and Whisker Plots of Net Social Benefit (3% discount rate) 
 
 
5.3  Sensitivity Analysis of Key Risk Factors 
 
For each of the seven policies, we completed a sensitivity analysis of key risk factors, examining 
specific alternative assumptions related to alternative policy designs, discount rates, and natural 
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gas prices. We use the societal perspective, where: (1) costs include public and private 
investments, and (2) benefits include energy savings and damages avoided from criteria 
pollutants and carbon dioxide emissions. We complete three pairs of cost-benefit analyses:  
 
• The first pair assumes the principal policy design and applies a 3% and a 7% discount 
rate.  
• The second pair assumes an alternative policy design and again uses a 3% and a 7% 
discount rate.  
• The third pair assumes that natural gas prices are 2 standard deviations above or below 
the mean forecasted price.  
 
This range of gas prices exceeds the ranges based on historic studies and are outside the bounds 
of the fan graph shown in Figure 5. We elect to examine far greater uncertainty in future gas 
prices based on the recent emergence of shale gas, which may succeed or fail to become a major 
new source of future gas (International Energy Agency, 2011). For example, in 2020, natural gas 
prices in the reference case for OBES & EPS at 2 standard deviations below the mean are $2.32 
($2009)/MMBtu and at 2 standard deviations above the mean are $6.97 ($2009)/MMBtu.  
 
As expected, social benefit-cost ratios are always higher for the seven policies when lower 
discount rates are used, since up-front investment costs are offset by years of energy savings that 
are more significant when discount rates are low. The natural gas price sensitivity, on the other 
hand, is highly variable and has opposite effects for some policies. Specifically, the two policies 
that promote combined heat and power experience the greatest range of cost-effectiveness 
reflecting the higher risk that natural gas prices pose to their cost-effectiveness. The lowest 
natural gas prices produce social benefit-cost ratios of 18 for OBES and 30 for EPS, while the 
highest prices produce ratios of 7 and 8, showing that these two policies still pass this severe 
stress test. The other five policies are more cost-effective when natural gas prices are high 
because they are reducing energy consumption by implementing efficiency measures, so higher 
gas prices drive up their energy-savings benefits. 
 
Several additional insights resulted from the analysis of key policy design uncertainties, showing 
the power of this additional examination of risk factors.  
 
• We consider a rapid (five-year) state adoption period for output-based emissions standards in 
the principal policy versus a slow (ten-year) adoption period in the alternative case. The 
PACE sensitivity was also slower than its principal formulation (a 20-year versus a five-year 
adoption period). These sensitivities highlight the net social benefit of more rapid policy 
implementation.  
 
• We evaluate an EPS supported by an investment tax credit that operates for 24 years (in the 
principal policy) but consider a 10-year duration in a sensitivity analysis. This sensitivity 
analysis highlights the greater societal benefits of the 24-year ITC, but it also shows that the 
shorter ITC has a more attractive benefit-cost ratio because of the lower level of free 
ridership. As a result, the 10-year policy sensitivity outperforms the 24-year subsidy in terms 
of societal benefit/cost ratios. The energy saved by free riders, who would have adopted these 
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programs without the supporting policies, are not included in the benefit totals, but they do 
impact the public costs when subsidies are provided to such firms. 
 
• Three of the sensitivities model lower levels of market penetration, underscoring the value of 
striving for deeper and more widespread efficiency investments. In the SEP program, 40% of 
facilities are assumed to adopt the SEP program in the principal policy, but the policy 
sensitivity assumes a lower penetration, at 20% of large facilities. The benefit/cost ratios are 
comparable for these two designs, but the net societal benefits are twice as large when the 
higher market penetration is achieved. Similarly, we evaluate the difference between 
assuming a rate of penetration of 60% of recommended measures by small firms 
participating in the SFEM program (in the principal case) versus 40% penetration in the 
alternative case, and we assume a lower level of funding and fewer participants for the 
Implementation Support Services program as an alternative. The impact on the CBA metrics 
is similar. 
 
• For the industrial motor rebates program, the principal policy assumes that firms will 
purchase new motors rather than fix new standard motors five years earlier than would have 
otherwise occurred without the rebate, while the sensitivity assumes a ten-year acceleration. 
The 10-year acceleration sensitivity produces greater savings and higher benefit-cost ratios 
not because it replaces more motors, but because the assumption is that it replaces motors 




Figure 9. Sensitivity Analysis of Key Risk Factors Using Social Benefit-Cost Ratios  
 
Benefits of the seven policies are not additive, as they can both overlap in addressing identical 
markets and opportunities, and they also can work synergistically, producing more benefits when 
one policy enables another (as happens with workforce development programs). Cost 
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effectiveness also involves assessing the overall public costs of each policy and the ability of 
these public investments to leverage energy savings and carbon dioxide emission reductions. The 
focus on overall government costs is particularly important given current concerns regarding 
public deficits and the desire to constrain government spending.  
 
5.4  Summary Assessment of Policies 
 
Each of these seven policy options has an appropriate federal role and broad applicability across 
industries. They utilize readily available technologies (or new technologies that will be available 
over the course of the implementation period), are administratively feasible, and have 
additionality and synergy with other efforts. Other strengths are the market transformation 
impact of the Superior Energy Performance program, the development of information technology 
products for Small Firm Energy Management, and the additionality of tax lien financing. Output-
based emissions standards have a narrow focus on a single technology (CHP), and a federal 
Energy Portfolio Standard might have many free riders, but the CBA is nonetheless highly 
favorable. Although the Industrial Motor Rebates have relatively high public costs, their benefits 
exceed their costs under a range of plausible assumptions. A generalized stakeholder assessment 
indicates that industrial firms, service providers, and others would support these policy options, 
while many of those utilities that might experience revenue erosion from these energy-efficiency 
initiatives, might consider them undesirable. 
 
A more complete analysis of the impacts of industrial energy-efficiency investments might 
increase the social benefit-cost ratios of these policies. There is a growing literature that 
documents several categories of "non-energy" financial benefits including reduced operating and 
maintenance costs, improved process controls, increased amenities or other conveniences, water 
savings and waste minimization, and direct and indirect economic benefits from downsizing or 
elimination of other equipment (Prindle, 2010). Our analysis also does not include externalities 
associated with the extraction of fuels (including environmental and public health externalities) 
(Pond et al, 2008; Bernhardt and Palmer, 2011) or transmission and distribution (Sovacool, 
2008). On the other hand, the avoidance of environmental damages that contributes to the high 
societal benefit-cost ratios of these seven policies could be overstated if EPA regulations are 
tightened over the next several decades and if a price is put on the cost of carbon. Those two 
actions would produce many of the social benefits that, in their absence, would be important 




The energy-efficiency gap in the U.S. industrial sector is large. Our analysis suggests that 
policies could help motivate businesses to focus more of their resources on “leaner” 
manufacturing systems. With the right policy environment, industry could shrink its energy-
efficiency gap and become a bigger part of the climate solution while at the same time 
strengthening its competitiveness and maintaining domestic jobs. The deterministic calculations 
of cost-effectiveness suggest that the seven policies would also be highly desirable both from the 




The uncertainty analysis, on the other hand, highlights the degree that these favorable 
benefit/cost calculations could be challenged by the occurrence of low-probability extreme 
events. For example, if natural gas prices were to surge, the private sector would benefit 
significantly less from a large commitment to natural gas-powered combined heat and power 
systems. Similarly, if the benefits of climate remediation prove to be negligible, then the social 
benefit-cost ratio of these policies would not be as appealing. By incorporating risk factors that 
manufacturers and policy-makers cannot forecast with certainty, we have examined the 
robustness of these seven industrial energy efficiency policies. Overall we conclude that the 
societal cost-effectiveness of policies is generally more sensitive to alternative assumptions 
about damages from criteria pollutants and climate change compared with energy prices; 
however, risks also vary across policies based partly on the technologies they target. 
Nevertheless, for the range of uncertainties we believe to be plausible, the federal policy options 
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